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In accordance with OECD definitions, agricultural risks are characterized into three distinct layers. 
The first consists of production risks that occur frequently and are typically managed by means of on-farm 
instruments, such as diversification and adoption of risk reducing technologies. Within the second layer, 
given that risk events are infrequent and idiosyncratic, different risk sharing instruments, such as private 
insurance schemes, are more appropriate to manage them. When adverse events are more systemic and 
catastrophic, the market for insurance fails and can break down completely. These catastrophic production 
risks (3rd layer) are those events with a low probability of occurrence (rare events) leading to major and 
typically irreversible losses with a potentially adverse impact on regions because of its systemic 
component (correlation), and ultimately on business results. Rarity and severity are typically associated 
with catastrophic risks: the more severe a risk, the rarer it is, and vice versa.  
There are several reasons that explain the market’s failure to protect against catastrophic risks (3rd 
layer); these include the farmer underestimating the catastrophic risks and the difficulty of insurance 
companies to provide sufficient reinsurance capacity. Public policies that intervene on the insurance 
market also play an important role in either solving or exacerbating market failures and, thus in defining 
the boundary between the second and the third layer.  
Public policies typically focus on two objectives. The first is to enhance the supply of insurance and 
to promote insurance markets for risks that would be otherwise non-insurable and non-tradable. These 
policies seek to expand the layer of marketable risks through different private-public partnership 
arrangements so as to extract at least some of the insured’s willingness to pay and co-finance protection 
that would otherwise fall within the sole responsibility of the public sector. 
A second objective has been to deliver disaster assistance. The experience, however, has been that 
disaster assistance programmes have been more or less ad hoc and ex post. Ad hoc payments could be 
effective in achieving disaster relief and almost all EU member states provide ad hoc payments. However, 
procedures and compensation have been decided under political pressure after an adverse event. Assistance 
has been unconditional so that farmers’ eligibility for the disaster aid has not been conditioned on his/her 
prior participation in insurance policies. Therefore, ad hoc disaster assistance has had a tendency to distort 
the market for risk rather than provide some form of complementarity and to promote the insurance 
market.  
The final effects of the disaster assistance programmes on the insurance market depend on their 
anticipated trigger (the strike), the scale and the coverage. In particular, the determination of the trigger, 
i.e. what level of rarity, severity and correlation should be defined as a catastrophe – is arbitrary. For 
example, Article 70 of the European Commission specifies certain conditions related to the design of 
public-private insurance schemes. A premium subsidy may only be granted if a climatic event destroys 
more than 30% of the average annual production. The need to delineate a boundary of what is a catastrophe 
and thus justifying catastrophic assistance is of eminent importance. Clearly, different definitions may lead 
to significantly different calls on public funds. 
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It is evident that these two objectives with arbitrary definitions are conflicting and inconsistent in 
drawing the boundary between marketable risks and non-marketable catastrophic risks. The first expands 
the layer of marketable risks, whereas the second downsizes it. We argue that a well-defined trigger level 
designed ex ante and drawing a credible line between the two layers is needed to avoid that insurance 
subsidies become just an (inefficient) form of support; for example, the potential disadvantage of rent 
seeking by (re)-insurance and reinsurance companies that off-load their worst risks onto the government. 
Further, farmer eligibility for disaster aid should be conditioned on his/her participation in the insurance 
programmes to increase consistency between the programmes and to enhance market for risk within the 
second layer. Producers can only benefit if they have purchased insurance, and assistance is not provided 
for events that are insurable. This hybrid insurance system combines marketable risks as well as non-
marketable catastrophic risks and has several advantages in comparison to ad hoc disaster assistance in 
dealing with catastrophic risk. First, the system is transparent and losses are appraised by experienced 
experts, while the indemnities are paid rapidly. Second, farmers participate financially in the scheme and 
share responsibility for risk management. Third, the main administrative burden of the system is 
transferred to insurers. The government can either be the lender of last resort by providing reinsurance, or 
subsidise the insurance premiums. The latter has the advantage that governments need not bear the risk in 
their budgets because the risk is transferred to private (re-)insurers. It is expected that complementary or 
supplementary between the two programmes have considerable implications to their efficacy. If 
governments continue to provide free and unconditional ad hoc disaster relief, the producer’s belief on the 
availability of disaster relief will remain, and thus an important incentive to participate in an ex ante 
insurance scheme will be severely undermined. 
Our normative analysis addresses the trade-offs between policies promoting adoption of voluntary 
insurance and providing disaster aid. By means of a Monte Carlo approach we simulate alternative 
insurance and disaster aid policies that affect the boundaries between insurable risks (2nd layer) and 
catastrophic risks (3rd layer). The policy scenarios involve complementarity or substitutability between 
participation in insurance programmes and access to disaster aid. We also simulate the credibility of the ex-
ante boundaries between these programmes with a view that disaster aid programmes will not erode the 
insurance market.  
Our analysis is highly policy relevant, since disaster assistance will continue to be an important policy 
measure in times of such severe crises that go beyond insurable risks and the coverage of agricultural 
insurance. An unconditional ad hoc disaster assistance is not, however, the most efficient approach to 
providing protection against catastrophic risks while enhancing insurance programmes for more tradable 
risks. It is unlikely that subsidized insurance programmes alone could fully substitute for the politically 
appealing disaster aid. Thus, new information on the trade-offs between alternative insurance and disaster 
aid programmes is valuable for designing consistent policies. A major challenge is to ensure that the 
system deters ex post assistance and is efficient in defining the boundaries of catastrophic risk. In 
summary, public insurance systems may play two different roles: one as a device to deliver disaster 
assistance and another to enhance insurance for marketable risks. We argue that a well-defined trigger 
level is needed so that insurance subsidies avoid becoming an (inefficient) form of support. 
 
 
